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Chapter 2 – International developments 
 
Transition to the modern era 
1905 marked the high tide of Australian independence in making 
copyright policy. The tide then ran out. Between 1908 and 1910, the 
Berne Convention’s Berlin Revision, the British Board of Trade’s 
inquiry into the law of copyright, and the Imperial Copyright 
Conference, created new policy for the British Empire. Australia 
responded promptly to developments, enacting copyright legislation in 
1912 that incorporated the British Copyright Act of 1911. 
The new legislation unambiguously recognised property in abstractions 
and made clear that copyright was not subject specific: it did not apply 
in distinct ways to literary property – books – or musical or dramatic 
‘pieces’ or the manifestations of ‘fine arts’. It applied to mental 
formulations designated ‘works’ and the physical configuration that 
allowed a work to be fixed, multiplied and distributed. In short, distinct 
copyrights could apply to the work and the physical format that 
embodied it. Legal protection lasted for 50 years after the death of the 
author or, in the case of the product embodying a work, 50 years from 
the date of production. 
The consequences of these changes were momentous. Once nations 
agreed that the physical format embodying copyright works was 
mutable – not restricted to a fixed category such as books – and that 
each format attracted copyright protection, they opened the way for the 
industries that fixed works in records or film to control the 
multiplication of copies. Authors, the intended beneficiaries of 
copyright legislation, would now share its benefits with the film and 
music industries. The industries did not consider copyright protection a 
necessary condition for economic success. But the aggressive drive for 
authors’ rights forced them into a game of brinkmanship that secured 
new forms of analogous copyright undreamt of a few years earlier. The 
fledgling bird released in 1905 now truly took wing. 
The half dozen years following the Act of 1905 marked an end and a 
beginning. All vestiges of copyright literalism, the idea that property  
in abstractions is impossible, were swept from legal discourse,  
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and Macaulay’s arguments for a narrow reading of copyright’s  
scope rejected. 
Copyright modernism 
The London booksellers’ agitation for perpetual copyright failed in 
1774, but their efforts marked the beginning of a campaign that, nearly 
140 years later, secured legislative recognition of intangible property. 
Their arguments, sustained by moral certitude, continue to be  
reprised in favour of extending the reach of the law. Great names of 
English law, including Lord Mansfield and William Blackstone,1 
asserted the natural right of authors to property in their work and, 
consistent with John Locke’s appropriation theory, a right to own the 
product of their labour. 
Inevitably, the 18th century debate settled around the question of 
whether an abstraction could be owned. The booksellers had no doubt. 
So long as the author’s work could be realised in physical form, they 
said, the requirements of property were substantively satisfied. This 
modernist thesis – modern because the rationale is still commonly 
advanced today – said that as a matter of justice, the object of 
protection must be the mental composite given shape by the author of 
a work.  
By contrast, the argument against literary property asserted that mental 
formulations could not be owned. However real, they, unlike realty or 
chattels, could not be possessed, occupied, disposed of, or destroyed. A 
book could be owned but not its contents. In the words of Attorney 
General Thurlow in Donaldson v Becket (1774), a literary work was 
“beyond the comprehension of man’s understanding and hardly 
capable of being defined”. As Justice Yates said in Millar v Taylor (1769), 
the property alleged by the booksellers “is in the mind alone; incapable 
of other modes of acquisition or enjoyment, than by mental possession 
… these are the phantoms which the author would grasp and confine 
to himself.”2  
The argument over literary property thus raised, at an early stage in 
copyright history, the problem of applying to abstractions rules 
designed for the physical world. If property in a work arises on material 
                                                     
1 William Murray (later Lord Mansfield) in Millar v Kinkaid and Tonson v Walker, and 
Blackstone in Tonson v Collins. 
2 Bently and Sherman, supra.  
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fixation, materiality determines ownership and the work itself can only 
be said to be possessed nominally. Undefined according to the canons 
of physical measurement, existing in the spirit realm, the “phantom” to 
which Justice Yates referred cannot be said to conform to the ordinary 
rules governing property subsistence. 
Literary property advocates, however, maintained that a book was 
simply the physical means for realising the work. The book – a chattel – 
and the work – literary property – were conceptually distinct but 
physically indivisible. Justice Aston made this point in Millar v Taylor. 
He asserted that “when … communicated to the sight and 
understanding of every man by the medium of printing, the work becomes 
a distinguishable subject of property.”3  
It was enough, so far as property rules were concerned, for mental 
work to be reduced to physical form. The work could then be enjoyed 
by possession of the thing in which it was embodied. No title was 
claimed in the ideas expressed – the author owned the expression of 
the ideas.4 For literalists such as Thurlow, this point of view was 
untenable. It was not sufficient to say that realisation in material form 
of an abstract work satisfied the absolute legal requirement that 
property must be definable. The law recognised property in certain 
incorporeal subject matter, such as the right to sue to recover a debt, 
but in such an instance, the property consisted of something readily 
definable – a legal right. The idea of literary property, however, 
required acceptance of the concept that while material form defined the 
protected subject matter, copyright actually vested in something 
distinct, intangible, intrinsically indefinable. For the literalists, such a 
formula stretched the idea of property too far. 
Though the literalists won the argument in Donaldson v Becket, the 
extended litigation over common law copyright began the march of 
copyright modernism. Perhaps because of the intensity of controversy, 
                                                     
3 Discussed Bently and Sherman, supra, p28. 
4 Supporters of literary property drew a clear distinction between the book and its 
literary contents. As Rose, supra, noted, Blackstone’s Commentaries popularised the 
idea of property in immaterial works, making clear that the subject of legal 
protection was the invisible literary work. “The paper and print are merely 
accidents, which serve as vehicles to convey [the author’s] style and sentiment to a 
distance. Every duplicate therefore of a work … is the same identical work, which 
was produced by the author’s invention and labour.” However, the drafters of the 
1842 Act did not explicitly distinguish between works and the material form to 
which they were reduced.  
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and closeness of the final vote among the Law Lords, the interested 
public could accept the idea of property in the invisible. Sympathetic 
legislators, however, continued to work in a conceptual fog, making no 
distinction between property in a ‘book’ and the expressive contents of 
the book.  
In the British Empire, the fog did not lift until 1911, when the new 
British Act adopted the scheme of works enunciated in the Berne 
Convention. Perhaps the absence of conceptual clarity evident in the 
Copyright Act of 1842, and to a lesser extent, the Australian Act of 
1905, pointed to uneasiness over the doctrine of abstract property. The 
drafting of the latter Act, in particular, seemed consciously to avoid 
recognising a flexible category of works that could extend copyright 
much beyond the world of literary and musical publishing. 
Literal arguments against copyright seemed to fall out of favour almost 
as soon as the Lords handed down their decision in Donaldson v Becket. 
Why this was so is not hard to understand. A century before the  
literary property debates, the philosopher John Locke asserted that 
labour supplied the basis for the creation of property, and his  
older contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, stated that within the  
boundaries created by the social contract, individuals could construct 
the world as they saw fit. Taken together, these principles provided the 
basis for a permissive view of property rights that by the late 18th 
century would take for granted the right of individuals to own the fruits 
of their intellects.  
Thus the victory of the literalists in Donaldson v Becket proved 
anomalous. Copyright literalism dissolved in thin air and the modernist 
argument infiltrated the legislative consciousness. When, in 1886, the 
Berne Convention created international consensus in favour of 
property in works, it was only a matter of time before Britain enacted 
copyright rules that reflected the new understanding.  
The influence of the Convention, and the political activity of the 
phonographic industry, defending itself against the assertion of the 
mechanical reproduction right, emerge as the twin determinants of 
copyright policy-making in the years 1905–1912. The British and 
Australian Copyright Acts of 1911 and 1912 showed no traces of the 
literalism discernible in the statutes they replaced. By the end of the 
first decade of the 20th century, copyright was no longer explicitly tied 
to books or any other format. The modern era had truly begun. 
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The Berlin Conference of 1908 
The scope of authors’ rights 
The Berlin Conference called to discuss revisions to the Convention 
texts adopted in 1886 (in Berne) and 1897 (in Paris), spread the 
copyright gospel to the world.5 Britain promptly ratified the Conference 
text on behalf of the Empire and set about giving legal effect to the 
agreed principles. Soon came the 1911 Copyright Act, adopted the 
following year in the Australian Copyright Act.  
The Berlin delegates systematically enlarged the scope of authors’ 
rights. Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other 
transformative reproductions of literary and artistic works were  
now to be protected as original works. Delegates confirmed the 
principle of national treatment. Union members were forbidden from 
making the grant of copyright dependent on formalities such as 
registration. The Convention permitted the author of a work to control 
its translation and prohibited reproduction of a journal article  
without the writer’s consent. Newspaper articles could, in the absence 
of explicit prohibition, be reproduced in other newspapers.  
Indirect appropriations, or adaptations – including dramatisations  
and abridgements – made without consent of the author were  
also prohibited. 
The delegates also agreed to a copyright term of life plus fifty years or 
fifty years from the date of making a mechanical reproduction,6 making 
clear that copyright had a life of its own distinct from that of the 
author. Copyright in a work could, in theory, be disposed of as a 
commodity by persons unknown to, and unconnected with, the author. 
Most significantly, the Conference text declared that authors should 
have the right to authorise mechanical recording of musical works and 
the public performance of those works. With this proposition, they 
                                                     
5 The decisions of the Conference affected a large proportion of the world’s 
population. Membership had grown slowly since 1897 to 16 nations (France 
Belgium, Spain, Italy, Monaco, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, Britain, Haiti, Honduras, Tunisia and Japan) but 21 non-Union 
members attended as observers (including the United States and most of the Latin 
American States) and the membership included, by default, the imperial possessions 
of Britain (including Australia) and France. The US and Latin American countries 
established parallel conventions. 
6 Members were not obliged to introduce the 50 year term into domestic law but 
most did.  
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started a battle that began the transformation of the copyright system 
into the instrument of industrial power.  
Until now, statesmen, politicians, and no doubt the interested public, 
could happily assent to the message of authorial entitlement spread by 
Victor Hugo, Bernard Shaw and others. It symbolised, seemingly, a 
benign and useful aspiration. But if justice for authors meant the right 
to control, and possibly disrupt, the production of phonograms, on 
which a new industry relied for profit, and the music-loving public for 
pleasure, the deserving author suddenly became a more sinister figure. 
The fatal concession 
Now, for the first time, the Berne Union overreached itself. The 
advocates of authors’ rights ran into opposition. For the first time in 
the history of international copyright law-making, the creative interest 
found it must bend to the industrial if conflict arose. In one sense, the 
authors’ rights movement caused its own downfall, though the 
influence of the Convention testifies to the Union’s remarkable success 
in realising its program. From the beginning, the admixture of 
mercenary motives hopelessly contaminated the ideal of moral justice 
for creators. Berlin delegates now discovered that if authors wanted the 
right to control “indirect appropriations” of musical works by 
mechanical reproduction, they would have to deal with a ruthless 
industry not inclined to give much weight to considerations of moral 
rights or natural justice.  
At Berlin, the phonographic industry fought the battle for the producer 
interest and won a defensive victory. The amending text laid down that 
members could make the grant of the mechanical right subject to 
“reservations and conditions”, meaning that a country could introduce 
a compulsory licensing scheme that allowed reproduction without 
consent. Countries could even grant manufacturers a parallel copyright 
in mechanical reproductions. It is not certain that the industry would 
have involved itself in copyright regulation had the Berne Union  
not recognised the author’s mechanical copyright. In any event, in 
securing provision in the Berlin text for countries to impose 
reservations and conditions on the right, the industry’s representatives 
established a pattern of active persuasion imitated by different 
industries in the future. 
They also ensured that their industry and the fledgling film industry 
could expect, over time, to receive the benefits of property rights. And 
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what could in principle extend to these industries could extend also to 
the broadcasting industry and any other industry reproducing or 
disseminating works. The final decision of the Conference, to recognise 
a new category of cinematographic works, went largely unnoticed, but it 
also symbolised the delegates’ expansive conception of copyright as a 
mode of regulation that could extend flexibly to encompass new 
technological means of utilising and disseminating works.  
After 1908, authors saw the apparent boon of a mechanical 
reproduction right undone by the fatal concession allowing countries to 
limit the scope of the new right. For all their appeals to a moral 
authority derived from the founding principles of the Union, they 
discovered that sentiment is no safeguard against the cold calculations 
of commerce. 
The Gorrell Committee 
Soon after the Berlin Conference ended, the British Board of Trade 
appointed a copyright committee, chaired by Lord Gorrell, to examine 
the amended Berne Convention. The Gorrell Committee reported in 
December 1909, recommending that Britain ratify the Convention.7 
Then in 1910 the Government produced a copyright bill and called an 
imperial copyright conference to consider the bill. A new bill, 
introduced in 1911, passed into law as the imperial Copyright Act.  
The following year, Australia adopted the legislation in its new 
Copyright Act. 
The Times described the Gorrell Committee as “very strong and 
impartial”. It consisted of literary and music publishers, Oxford 
University’s first professor of English, an artist, a playwright and two 
lawyers, including Sir Thomas Scrutton, an advisor to the Government 
and author of a famous late 19th century text, The Law of Copyright. 
Scrutton also appeared for the plaintiff in Boosey v Whight and could be 
expected to firmly endorse the author’s right to unfettered control of 
mechanical reproduction. 
So constituted, the Committee stood firmly for authors’ rights and 
could be expected to endorse implementation of the Berne Convention 
                                                     
7 The British delegates informed the Berlin Conference that any opposition of 
Britain’s self-governing dominions would present a serious obstacle to Britain’s 
accession. The dominions gave assent in 1910 at the Imperial Conference of 1910. 
All the parties accepted the provisions of the draft British Copyright Bill prepared 
by the Board of Trade, and agreed to adopt substantially similar legislation.  
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in British law, which it duly did. But without a single member who 
understood the driving commercial necessity that created animosity to 
proposals for an unqualified mechanical reproduction right, the 
Committee struggled to answer the main question placed before it.  
The mechanical reproduction right 
Its members did not doubt that Britain should implement the revised 
Berne Convention but they faced a difficult choice. Should they 
recommend qualification of the mechanical reproduction and allied 
performance rights prescribed by the revised Convention, or insist that 
the rights vest absolutely in authors? Article 13(1) of the revised 
Convention stated: 
The authors of musical works shall have the exclusive right of authorising (1) the 
adaptation of those works to instruments which can produce them mechanically; (2) 
the public performance of the said works by means of these instruments.  
 
If enacted, these rights would give British music composers and 
publishers unprecedented power to dictate commercial terms to the 
manufacturers of records. Qualification, permitted by the Article 13(2),8 
would return bargaining power to the manufacturers. As the Gorrell 
Committee heard, the recording industry grew wealthy from the 1880s 
by recording musical works without consent.  
After 1899, Boosey v Whight stood as authority for the principle that 
mechanical processes that facilitated the mechanical performance of 
musical works did not infringe copyright. From the distance of more 
than a century, the judgment of Justice Stirling can be seen as the last 
gasp of copyright literalism. He saw clearly that the creators of the 1842 
Act intended that copyright apply to books, in a broad sense that 
comprehended dramatic, musical and fine art compositions.  
They did not intend that definitions of copyright be stretched to 
include mechanical operations, or indeed abstractions that could not be  
rendered on a page.9 The authors’ rights movement brooked no such 
                                                     
8 “Reservations and conditions relating to the application of this article may be 
determined by the domestic legislation of each country in so far as it is concerned; 
but the effect of any such reservations and conditions will be strictly limited to the 
country which has put them in force.”  
9 An interesting aspect of the judgment in Boosey v Whight is that Justice Stirling’s 
reasons for denying copyright in the perforations in a music roll in some ways 
prefigure the arguments given by some common law judges in the 1980s for not 
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posited limitation. Advocates insisted that authors must control 
mechanical processes that allowed for the performance or 
dissemination of works. The profit motive silenced dissent. Thus 
Article 13(2) stoked controversy. Authors and publishers on one hand, 
and the recording industry on the other, prepared to battle before 
Parliament for the right to control the manufacturing process. 
The Committee received 25 submissions from artists, architects, 
musicians and writers, four from publishers, four from newspapers and 
printers, and 14 from the phonographic industry. Authors, the creators 
of literary, dramatic, artistic and musical works, comprised an active 
faction that pursued its interests independently from the literary and 
musical publishers. George Bernard Shaw gave evidence to the 
Committee on behalf of the Society of Authors and Georges Maillard 
spoke for the International Literary and Artistic Association, the 
principal instigator of the Berne Convention.  
Amazingly, however, only one music publisher gave evidence to the 
Committee, even though the recording industry was, according to the 
publishers, destroying the sales of sheet music. On the other hand, the 
Copyright Association and the Publishers’ Association ably represented 
literary publishers. The Publishers’ Association cunningly sought to 
enlarge the author’s reproductive right to include methods of 
reproduction not yet discovered, proposing that legislation refer to 
reproduction by “mechanical and other means”. 
The Columbia Phonograph Company pointed out that the 
phonographic industry had become more than an economic 
phenomenon: 
During the present generation, there has sprung up an industry in instruments that 
mechanically reproduce music, so vast and far-reaching that in every civilised country 
on the globe talking machines and piano players are influencing the lives and temper 
of the masses of the people, bring into the homes of the rich and the poor, but 
especially to the humbler classes of the community, the elevating and educational 
advantages of the purest and most beneficent of the arts. 
 
                                                                                                           
recognising copyright in the object code of computer programs. Justice Stirling 
considered that copyright vested in the literary notation of musical symbols on a 
page but not perforations “for the production of musical sounds”. 
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Compulsory licence 
What is most noticeable in the statements of evidence is the 
phonographic industry’s determined pressing of the case for a 
compulsory licence to record musical works. For the spokesmen of the 
recording companies, 20 years of effort and investment were at stake 
and they pushed their message relentlessly. John Drummond 
Robertson, the manager of the Gramophone Company (the  
forerunner of EMI), and later prominent in public debate over the 1911 
Copyright Bill, drew the Committee’s attention to the industry’s 
economic contribution: 
How great are the interests involved in the case of a company like our own with its 
branches and agencies and affiliated companies extending over Europe, Asia, 
Africa, and Australasia requires little demonstration. In illustration we only adduce 
that during the last year, we, ourselves, paid no less than £150,000, in wages and 
salaries, and that the tangible assets of our company, as shown in its last Report, 
amounted to £757,000. 
The spokesmen of the record companies based their arguments on 
principles of fairness. Why, they asked, should a legitimate industry 
contributing to employment and satisfying public demand, now be 
forced to surrender its autonomy to creators? Why should justice for 
authors mean that the industry must cede control of a practice which 
the law, and previously the Berne Union itself, considered acceptable? 
For Drummond Robertson, the novelty of the proposed mechanical 
right compounded the unfairness. The right must: 
[A]t any rate in British law, be regarded not as the extension of an existing right, 
but as the creation of a new one. This new right can only be put into effect at the 
expense of somebody, and in this case the burden is to be placed on our trade … it 
must not be forgotten that our industry has grown up under the aegis of the Berne 
Convention internationally, and at home under domestic law, and that vast interests 
have been created under conditions which specifically denied to the composer any right 
in phonographic publication. 
According to Robertson, having consented for so long to the practice, 
the legislature had no reasonable basis for arbitrarily depriving the 
industry of the power to record, without the author’s consent, 
performances of works: 
It is in our opinion, a case for equitable adjustment as between the claims of those 
who acquire a new right in virtue of statute, and of those who are called upon to 
surrender interests, created under existing international and domestic law. We hold 
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that legislation should not create an unrestricted right in phonographic publication, 
but should strike a fair bargain as between conflicting interests. 
The creative interest, on the other hand, asserted, in the words of the 
Gorrell Report, that they “should have the exclusive right of 
authorising the adaptation of their work to such instruments 
[phonograms] – that it is in reality part of the literary property which 
they have in the products of their own brains.” Composers also 
objected to the compulsory licence on they grounds of integrity, 
alleging that unless they controlled the process of reproduction, they 
would be unable to prevent the production of degraded versions of 
their work. 
The Committee members agreed unequivocally that as a matter of 
justice, composers should be granted the power to control mechanical 
reproduction of their works. As they pointed out in the report, most 
“of the witnesses who advocated a compulsory licence did not deny the 
justice of the author’s claim”. On this question, the Gorrell Committee 
saw no difficulty and recommended adoption of the first paragraph of 
Article 13. But the Committee frankly admitted that in determining the 
“reservations and conditions” that should apply to the right it 
confronted “certain very difficult questions”. 
The question of investment 
The report discussed the question of the compulsory licence at much 
greater length than any other topic. As the Committee said, it 
considered the arguments “very carefully” and “thought it right to state 
the two views somewhat fully”. In the end, in the time-honoured 
tradition of government inquiries, it decided on a compromise that it 
perhaps hoped would create Drummond Robertson’s “fair bargain” 
between “competing interests”. 
It rejected the compulsory licence, and in particular the argument that 
in the hands of authors the manufacturing right would “produce a 
monopoly which would ruin the businesses of a large number of 
manufacturers”. Given the large number of composers and the 
“enormous” demand for phonographs, “it seems probable that the 
views of the witnesses are exaggerated.” The Committee based its 
decision on the principle of freedom of contract, which, in Britain, “has 
generally been considered … most beneficial to the development of all 
kinds of industries”. Composers were a diffuse class, with differing 
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priorities, and no single manufacturer was likely to secure licences from 
even the majority of them. Monopoly was therefore unlikely. 
The Committee did, however, accept the argument that the law should 
recognised or protect the investment of the industry over many years. 
As its report said, “discs and other records are only produced at 
considerable expenditure.” More significantly, the manufacturers also 
displayed “a considerable amount of art and ingenuity in the making up 
of these records”. The manufacturers were “producing works which are 
to a certain extent new and original, and into which the reproduction of 
the author’s part has only entered to the extent of giving the original 
basis of production”. For these reasons, the Committee members 
considered records as “one of the things which can be the subject of 
copyright and further recommend that public performances by means 
of pirated copies of these records should also be treated as an 
infringement of the rights of the manufacturer.” 
Phonogram and performance copyright  
The Gramophone Company and the Columbia Phonograph Company 
(on behalf of a large group of smaller manufacturers) both proposed a 
manufacturer’s copyright in recordings and their public performance. 
The Columbia Phonograph Company argued that if the law protected 
the owner of a musical work against piracy, it should equally protect the 
manufacturer of a record against counterfeit production. But once 
again, Drummond Robertson, on behalf of the Gramophone 
Company, presented the most persuasive arguments.  
He stated that “a twofold copyright protection should be accorded to 
the phonogram, and on precisely the same lines as the Convention 
affords protection to the cinematograph.” Quoting from the Report of 
the Berlin Conference, he pointed out that the Convention provided 
for copyright not only in cinematographs but translations and musical 
arrangements, if they could be regarded as original in character. “If this 
view is correct,” he said, “a phonogram is to be regarded as a mode of 
multiplication coming within the scope of Intellectual Ownership.”  
Drummond Robertson did not stop at requesting copyright in the 
phonogram. He claimed that phonographic companies should be 
granted the right to control performances of the sound recording. The 
public performance of a record was “merely a mechanical reproduction 
of the artiste’s original rendering, postulating no skill.” He advanced a 
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straightforward reason for granting the right: it represented “part return 
for the emoluments which the composer is to receive”. 
The Committee’s compromise 
The Times, a firm advocate of the creative interest10 gave vent to its 
feelings in two columns. The proposal to introduce copyright in 
records, and an allied public performance right, it declared  
“a really remarkable application of the doctrine of vested  
interests”. According to the newspaper, while it “would seem to be 
equitable that some concession should be made for the existing 
property of manufacturers”, only composers and authors deserved 
copyright protection.  
Though The Times might not admit it, the Berne Union and its 
advocates were no less a vested interest than the record manufacturers. 
Faced with two distinct economic factions that both engaged 
politicians’ sympathy, the Committee wrestled with a dilemma. The 
owners of works could make a persuasive claim for political preferment 
on moral grounds, and the producers of records could point to the 
economic and social benefits that their industry delivered to Britain. To 
solve the problem, the Committee gave with one hand, and took with 
the other.  
In doing so, it accelerated the trend, begun in Berlin the year before, to 
accommodating the claims of the industries that produced products 
embodying copyright works. The members of the Berne Union and the 
Gorrell Committee knew that few governments would pass legislation 
that might – according to the phonographic industry – endanger years 
of investment and production. Their willingness to contemplate allied 
rights for producers marched hand in hand with the growing realisation 
that the business of musical copyright had become big business.  
                                                     
10The Times covered the issue of copyright reform very closely, endorsing the 
Gorrell Report in a lengthy article on the first Copyright Bill introduced in 1910. 
The newspaper was, through its editorial and correspondence pages, the principal 
medium for public debate over the 1911 Copyright Bill. On its pages, authors, 
publishers, record manufacturers and interested individuals argued over the terms 
of the Bill. George Bernard Shaw and John Drummond Robertson engaged in an 
antagonistic controversy over compulsory licensing. In Australia, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, a very different newspaper, also discussed copyright. It made its sympathies 
clear when it said of Dickens that “His case is certainly proof that the time has 
come for some alteration of the copyright law, which will protect the property of a 
writer as well as the public interest.” (15 April 1911).  
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The Berlin Conference and Gorrell Committee did not agree on how 
copyright legislation should benefit producers, though both implicitly 
recognised in principle that producers were entitled to some benefit. 
The Berlin Revision formula of “reservations and conditions” 
contemplated a system of compulsory licensing but it did not recognise 
a manufacturers’ copyright in recordings. However the final 
Conference document did provide that cinematographic works could 
be protected separately as literary or artistic works if they displayed 
original character derived from “arrangement of the acting form or the 
combination of the incidents represented”.  
The Gorrell Committee took a different view. Drummond Robertson 
argued that if the Berlin Union could accept copyright in 
cinematographic works, the Gorell Committee could equally recognise 
copyright in records. The Committee members accepted his argument 
and they recommended legislation to create copyright in recordings. 
Unlike the delegates at the Berlin Conference, they rejected the idea of 
compulsory licensing, and also refused to support the proposal for 
manufacturers to receive a performing right in records.  
Weaknesses of Committee’s reasoning  
The Committee thus baulked at endorsing what the recording industry 
really wanted.11 Its unwillingness to support the compulsory licence 
pointed to intellectual confusion in copyright policy-making. The 
proponents of authors’ rights spoke of moral necessity but they wanted 
exclusive control of productive processes to which they contributed 
neither capital nor expertise. Claiming moral right, they did not admit 
mercenary motives. Nor were they asked to. Policymakers accepted 
moral arguments for copyright protection without examining the 
economic rationales underlying the demands for legislation.  
Their naïveté, deliberate or unwitting, provoked the angry assault of the 
industry threatened by the authors’ grab for power. The record 
companies, alarmed at the possibility that authors or publishers could 
dictate the terms on which records were made, furiously rejected what 
they considered a grab for economic power disguised in the language of 
                                                     
11 The compulsory licensing system allowed manufacturers to make, subject to 
paying the owner a royalty, a recording of any work already recorded with the 
owner’s authorisation. In developed form it originated in Germany (though France 
introduced a system of compulsory licensing in the 19th century) and had lately 
been introduced to the United States by the Copyright Act of 1909.  
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moral entitlement. On what basis, men like Drummond Robertson 
demanded to know, did the creative interest claim property in works? If 
they aimed to secure moral rights for authors, said Robertson, they had 
no need to demand control over the production and distribution of 
products embodying works.  
All they needed were equitable rights to restrain non-attribution or 
interference with the integrity of works. If they sought the exclusive 
right to control production, they were asking for something that bore 
no necessary relationship to the author’s moral rights. If securing 
economic return for the author’s labour and originality became a 
rationale for copyright protection then why should such protection not 
also protect the investment of industries that produced copyright 
material and thereby generated the returns that accrued to authors? 
Whether or not the Gorrell Committee members were alive to these 
considerations, logical doubts hang over its report and they apply to 
modern copyright policy-making. Considering its membership, a 
bookish gathering of lawyers, publishers and various authors’ 
representatives, it is not surprising that the Committee declined to take 
the bold step of recommending a compulsory licence. Two years later, 
British parliamentarians comfortable with the phonographic industry’s 
language of investment and profit expectations, proved much  
less tentative. 
They recognised that if the mechanical rights of authors were too 
extensive and those of manufacturers too limited, soon enough 
government might face a political problem it did not want: monopoly. 
As the industry itself argued, if the bargaining power of authors 
outweighed that of manufacturers, over time the most commercially 
powerful producer would probably succeed in outbidding its rivals to 
secure rights to the majority of works. 
Monopoly and the claims of industry 
The industry argued that if the legislature conferred on authors the 
power to exclude from the production process the majority of 
producers, it would create monopoly or oligopoly. The Gorrell 
Committee, though not blind to this possibility did not accept that the 
disaggregated mass of authors would license a single producer to make 
records. The Reported canvassed the issue of monopoly in some detail 
and quoted the first section of the 1909 US Copyright Act, which 
provided for compulsory licensing. But in the Committee’s view, the 
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“large number of composers” and “enormous production of, and 
demand for, these mechanical instruments” meant fears of monopoly 
were “exaggerated”.  
Committee members were not swayed by the evidence of the Columbia 
Phonograph Company, which referred to comments of the US House 
of Representatives’ Committee on Patents. The US House Committee 
declared that compulsory licensing prevented “the establishment of a 
mechanical-music trust” and further pointed out that without it,  
“the progress of science and useful arts would not be promoted, but 
rather hindered, and … powerful and dangerous monopolies might  
be fostered”.  
In a utilitarian political environment, no tenable policy could give new 
rights to authors and ignore the claims of the manufacturers who made 
the mechanical rights possible. But even though compulsory licensing 
seemed to offer a solution to the problem of reconciling the interests of 
creators and producers,12 the Gorrell Committee held back,  
hamstrung by its allegiance to authors’ rights. The Gorrell Committee 
presented its Report in 1909. In the 1911 parliamentary debates over 
the Copyright Bill, it would be apparent that to politicians, output, jobs 
and revenue counted for more than sentiment. They might speak 
platitudes about the moral rights of authors and purchase Dickens 
Stamps,13 but they would also legislate in favour of industries that were 
economically productive. 
Like the members of the Gorell Committee, the politicians of 1911 
seemed unwilling to face, or even utter, the difficult questions that 
called into doubt the logical integrity of copyright policy. In relation  
to musical recordings, for example, who played the more important 
role in making a recording a commercial success? Composer,  
                                                     
12 Owners of works were, in theory, compensated for the loss of bargaining power 
by a remuneration formula based on a fixed royalty paid on each sale. The method 
of remuneration remains the greatest source of contention in compulsory licensing 
schemes.  
13 A philanthropic scheme instituted in 1911 encouraged owners of copies of 
Dickens’s novels to purchase an ornamental stamp to be affixed in their books. The 
proceeds were to be held in trust and distributed to Dickens’s descendants. 
Supported by Lord Roseberry, Augustine Birrell and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 
among others, and launched at a grand mayoral meeting in the City of London, 
nothing very much seems to have come of it. In Australia, the Sydney Morning Herald 
supported the scheme, stating “Many of [Dickens’s] readers will be glad to take part 
in a truly democratic testimonial even if they do not agree … as to the excellence of 
the stamp.”  
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performer or manufacturer? The first expended the most intellectual 
effort, the second provided the vital human interpolation, the third 
took the financial risk. On what basis should any or all be granted 
rights of property? Was copyright regulation anything more than a 
system for extracting revenue from the public and distributing it to 
vested interests?  
Such questions were not asked in 1909, 1911 or 1912. The commercial 
users of music in Australia in the interwar years, grappling with claims 
for public performance payments, demanded to know the rationale that 
sanctioned mass remuneration under copyright legislation. Slowly, little 
by little, government responded to these difficult questions with 
legislation and policy justification. Whether the answers supplied in 
laws and official documents constitute an adequate response to the 
problems of conflicting interest remains an open question. 
The Imperial Copyright Conference 
A quest for uniformity 
Two months before sending delegates to the Berlin Revision 
Conference, the British Government began planning for an imperial 
conference to consider how the Berne Convention could be assimilated 
into the copyright laws of Britain and the self-governing dominions – 
Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. In early September 
1908, Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, advised the gubernatorial 
authorities that “an amendment of the existing law is urgently needed” 
and proposed discussion by a “subsidiary Conference with a view to 
concurrent legislation, if agreement can be arrived.” 
Crewe, jarred by the dominions’ negative response to draft imperial 
copyright legislation circulated in 1907, hoped that a conference to 
discuss the updated Berne Convention would lead to unanimity. For 
reasons of convenience, the Colonial Office abandoned Ottawa as the 
chosen venue for the conference, and selected London in its place. It 
proposed that the copyright conference would be held as a subsidiary 
meeting of the imperial conference scheduled for 1910. This decision 
illustrated both the practical significance of the proposed copyright 
legislation, and the emphasis placed by Whitehall on imperial unity. 
Imperial conferences, the first of which Britain hosted in 1907, replaced 
the old colonial conferences of the white colonies and reflected the new 
standing of the self-governing dominions. 
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They provided a forum for discussing matters of imperial unity and 
were the forerunner of today’s meetings of the Commonwealth Group 
of Nations. Britain’s readiness to add copyright to the list of primary 
matters to be discussed at the 1910 Conference indicated clearly the 
importance it attached to common legislative implementation of the 
revised Berne Convention. In the end, the imperial conference took 
place in 1911, but the subsidiary copyright conference went ahead as 
planned, in May 1910. 
Crewe had a particular reason for not rushing to convene a copyright 
meeting. By scheduling the Copyright Conference for 1910, he gave the 
Board of Trade time to digest the findings of the Gorrell Committee 
and prepare draft legislation for consideration. When the delegates of 
the self-governing dominions joined their British counterparts in 
London in 1910, they would have digested the recommendations of the 
Gorrell Report, and the Colonial Office could present them with the 
Bill to Amend and Consolidate the Law Relating to Copyright (1910).  
The President of the Board of Trade, Sydney Buxton, opened the 
Copyright Conference on 18 May 1910. He called ratification of the 
amended Berne Convention, recommended by the Gorrell Committee, 
“an imperial as well as a United Kingdom question”. For that reason “it 
was necessary … to take into consultation those representing the self-
governing Dominions over the seas.” Buxton stressed the need, arising 
from considerations of “efficiency” and “the Imperial connection”, for 
uniform copyright legislation throughout the Empire. “His Majesty’s 
Government,” he said, “consider it highly important to attain as great a 
degree of uniformity as is reasonably practicable among the principal 
Nations of the world with regard to international copyright.” 
While the British Government, according to Buxton, considered 
ratification “desirable”, it was “not committed in any sense” to “the 
detailed provisions of the Convention”. The provisions would be “fully 
open to discussion by the Conference”. For the British Government in 
1910, securing imperial unity on any legislation with international 
dimensions was a matter of real importance. Britain stood at the head 
of what might loosely be called a federated system of international 
government, and for reasons of trade and politics, needed to ensure 
that legislation passed in the dominions did not have the effect of 
damaging interests governed by British legislation. 
In copyright matters, for instance, British copyright owners would be 
furious if a country such as Australia passed legislation allowing for a 
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shorter term for protection of copyright works or the import into 
Australia, without consent of the copyright owner, of remaindered 
copies of British books. As Britain, and none of the dominions, was a 
member of the Berne Union, it could, if it chose, ratify the Berlin 
Revision without dominion assent. But if it did so, it put at risk the 
probability of all the dominions legislating to implement the 
Convention on uniform lines. 
Friendly and unanimous feeling 
Invited to remember “the Imperial connection” the Conference 
delegates showed, in words of Australia’s delegate, Lord Tennyson, 
“friendly and unanimous feeling” and the desire “as far as possible to 
get legislation on uniform lines”.14 The Conference began at the 
Foreign Office and, according to the memorandum of proceedings, 
“resolved itself into Committee for discussion of the subject in detail”. 
Delegates held seven meetings but their work attracted little public 
attention. The Times reported only that an imperial copyright conference 
“was held at the Foreign Office yesterday” and explained that it was 
“private” and “lasted for five hours”.  
The friendly and unanimous feeling of the delegates is scarcely 
surprising. The period immediately before the Great War perhaps 
represented the high point of imperial sentiment in Britain and the self-
governing dominions. In the Australian Senate debates on copyright in 
1905 and 1912, parliamentarians often referred to Britain as “Home”, 
not in the authentic sense of a place of belonging or return, but as an 
abstraction denoting the source of legislative unity in the Empire. John 
Keating, a Catholic of Irish descent schooled at Riverview, the Jesuit 
boarding school in Sydney,15 referred to “Home” twice in the copyright 
debates of 1912.  
In the early 20th century, many individuals embraced the idea of a 
union of equality and brotherhood between Britain and the self-
governing dominions.16 Public figures in favour of the imperial ideal 
                                                     
14 Cable, Tennyson to Prime Minister, 4 December 1911, National Archives of 
Australia.  
15 Where he was a schoolmate of the brilliant and tragic poet Christopher Brennan. 
16 An article The Times on 1 November 1911, reported the meeting of the Imperial 
Mission concerning ‘Imperial Unity’: “The Duke of Marlborough, who presided, 
said that the cardinal principles upon which the Imperial Mission laid stress were 
(1)Imperial Preference; (2) Imperial defence; and (3) emigration … If the Empire 
could hold together and could organise itself for cooperation in common purposes 
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were keen to create a collective of certain English-speaking nations 
that, united by common trade and social aims, could become federal in 
nature – an early prototype of the European Community, though with 
closer linguistic and historical ties binding members. Naturally, within 
this collective, legislation would need to be uniform or closely tied. 
For many Australian politicians, accepting a common imperial law 
incorporating an international copyright convention seemed a desirable, 
even necessary, act. However, it was not inevitable that the dominion 
representatives would assent to all the propositions that their hosts put 
to them at the Copyright Conference. Australian governments after 
1905, for example, consistently stated their hostility to the 50 year 
posthumous term proposed in the Berne Convention. But the death of 
King Edward VII 12 days before the Conference opened may have put 
an end to any thoughts of dissension. As London made sorrowful 
preparations for the royal funeral, the delegates breathed an 
atmosphere of patriotism and imperial sentiment that swirled through 
the city.  
When they first met on 18 May, it is unlikely that any intended to buck 
the trend towards uniformity. By the time the grandees of the Empire 
farewelled the King at Westminster Abbey on 22 May, the delegates 
had reached agreement after, according to the memorandum of 
proceedings, “full discussion”. They accepted 12 resolutions that 
supported, among other things, Britain’s ratification of the Berlin 
Convention “with as few reservations as possible”, the passing of new 
imperial legislation that would form the basis for uniform copyright 
codes, the adoption in legislation of the 50 year posthumous term, and 
the banning of importation of “pirated” copyright works into Britain or 
the Empire. 
To what extent King Edward’s death contributed to the uniformity of 
opinion at the Copyright Conference is a matter for speculation. No 
hint of fractiousness invaded proceedings and the British authorities 
secured the outcome they hoped for. They were helped greatly by the 
actions of Lord Tennyson, Australia’s delegate, who deliberately 
disobeyed instructions from the Australian Prime Minister concerning 
the 50 year posthumous term. Had Tennyson listened to orders from 
Melbourne, The Times would undoubtedly have detected an atmosphere 
of hostility in the corridors of the Foreign Office.  
                                                                                                           
then the status of the people of the Empire as a whole would be equal to that of any 
of the great foreign nations.”  
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Lord Tennyson and the copyright term 
After receiving Lord Crewe’s proposal in September 1908 for a 
copyright conference, the Australian Government adopted a casual 
approach to preparations. 18 months remained until the scheduled date 
for the conference and the Government seemed lulled by the time 
available for planning. Dilatoriness crept into preparations. No-one in 
Melbourne appeared to attach much importance to securing the 
services of an appropriate representative to protect Australian interests. 
John Keating, a government minister, or Sir Josiah Symon, an 
Independent at the time of the Conference, were two potential 
candidates for the role, and it was not impossible for either to absent 
himself from parliamentary duties to go to London.  
Instead, the Government appointed Lord Tennyson as its 
representative in November 1908. In doing so, it showed either 
carelessness regarding Australia’s interests or unblinking willingness to 
consent to whatever Britain might propose in copyright matters. By 
contrast, the other dominions appointed native representatives. Canada 
sent both its Minister for Agriculture and Registrar of Copyrights, New 
Zealand its High Commissioner and South Africa the Agent General 
for the Transvaal. 
The Government should have been in no doubt that Tennyson would 
support propositions put forward by his own nation, even if they 
conflicted with Australian wishes. The eldest son of the poet laureate 
Alfred Tennyson, Hallam Tennyson was the former Governor of South 
Australia (1899–1902) and Governor General of Australia (1903–04). 
Popular and hardworking in both roles, he felt deep loyalty to his 
country, and the tenor of his correspondence with Australian officials 
leaves no doubt that he expected Australia to adopt a subordinate role 
in its dealings with Britain. Tennyson qualified as a barrister, but did 
not practise, and it is unlikely that he knew much about copyright law. 
His qualification appeared to be his years of high office in Australia. On 
the one topic raised at the copyright conference about which the 
Australian Government stated a firm preference, he maintained a 
contrary view, in keeping with British wishes. The topic was the 50 year 
posthumous term.  
It is clear from the record that after appointing Tennyson and 
supplying him with copies of the Australian Copyright Act and related 
memoranda in January 1909, the Government took little interest in his 
doings, even though he consistently flouted stated policy. From the 
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start, Tennyson seemed interested in only one topic, that of the 
posthumous term. At his request, Captain Collins, the Commonwealth 
Representative in London, cabled Melbourne to seek directions on the 
question, and received an unequivocal reply from the Department of 
External Affairs: “Tennyson should be instructed not to favour 
extended term on part of Australia.” 
The department’s memorandum included an official statement of 
instructions from the Attorney General, Billy Hughes. Hughes declared 
the Government’s opposition to the 50 year term and provided reasons 
for its policy. The legislators of 1905, he said, evinced “considerable 
opposition” to the 30 year posthumous term and “there has been 
nothing to indicate a change of opinion since”. As he pointed out, the 
copyright interests of Australia and Britain were not always identical. 
“The number of works published, the authors of which would be 
benefited by the extended term, is small in Great Britain and probably 
nil in Australia. Consequently the matter is of greater relative 
importance in Great Britain than it is in Australia.” 
Tennyson had no reason for doubt about the Government’s position. 
Collins passed the memorandum, marked “Instructions to 
Commonwealth Representative”, to him directly. But he would not 
rest, and continued to pester Collins on the subject of copyright 
duration. He never explained why the question of term was important 
to him.  
He no doubt identified strongly with the cause of authors. Tennyson’s 
tastes, not surprisingly, were literary, he published two books, and  
he was his father’s companion and biographer. Unlike Dickens, the 
elder Tennyson, who benefited from government sinecures from 1845, 
is not reported to have complained about copyright piracy or the term 
of copyright protection. His son, however, may have been distressed 
when, after copyright in the incomplete first edition of In Memoriam 
lapsed, copies were widely circulated to the detriment of the  
poet’s reputation. 
At any rate, he pressed Collins to ask his masters in Australia to 
reconsider their position and at first they obliged. On 15 February 
1909, about six weeks after sending Tennyson the first memorandum 
from Melbourne, Collins telegraphed him relaying the news that he had 
been told to, “inform Tennyson if United Kingdom and other 
countries, Copyright Union agree extension fifty years, unlikely 
Commonwealth would not accept alteration”. For the rest of the year, 
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Tennyson stayed mostly silent, though he evidently caused minor 
offence by criticising the Australian Copyright Act. In April, Captain 
Collins cabled the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs on 
his behalf, conveying the statement that “I have always cabled my 
criticisms privately, direct to [the Government].”  
So stood matters until early 1910 and the dispatch to Tennyson of two 
cables from the Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin. Deakin wanted to 
retain the term for copyright set out in the 1905 Act, and also stated his 
opposition to copyright in the performance of dumbshows and works 
of architecture. Tennyson did not rush to respond but his return 
telegram, six weeks after Deakin’s last cable, was emphatic. He 
congratulated the Prime Minister on his “statesmanlike dispatch” then 
asked permission to “omit your Clause on term of copyright” on the 
grounds that “the authorities consider present system open to grave 
objections and strongly advocate addition of fixed term to the term of 
the authors’ life”. 
Tennyson’s ingenious references to “grave objections”, which implied 
that the correct copyright term could be arrived at by a process of logic, 
and unnamed ‘‘authorities”, perhaps the members of the Gorrell 
Committee, might have swayed Deakin, but the last sentence of his 
telegram, expressed with fantastic condescension, could also have 
proved fatal to his case. “If you insist,” he said, “on my advocating for 
literary work this clause of yours I shall be placed in grave difficulty. 
Leave me free hand.” As it happened, Deakin found no time to 
respond. He lost office on 29 April, to be replaced by Andrew Fisher, 
who immediately informed Tennyson that he wanted to review the new 
British Copyright Bill before deciding Australia’s position.  
Copies of the Bill were provided to delegates in advance of the 
Copyright Conference, but Tennyson evidently did not intend to share 
the contents with the Australian Prime Minister. On 17 May, the  
day before the start of the Copyright Conference, he cabled Fisher with 
a blunt message. “Your proposal to consider details of Bill going 
through Parliament here impracticable.” The Secretary of the  
Attorney General’s Department, Robert Garran, replied for Fisher. It 
was, he said plaintively, “not suggested that details of Bills going 
through Parliament should be considered … but that Commonwealth 
should have opportunity to consider draft Bill and make suggestions 
before introduction.” 
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The Australian Government seemed then to cave in to its noble 
representative. In his telegram to Fisher, Tennyson proposed that 
Australia commit by treaty “to legislate in general conformity with the 
convention upon legislation being introduced into the Imperial 
Parliament, and in favour of extension of copyright to life and 50 years 
and the general lines of the report of the Departmental Committee.” In 
the absence of contrary instructions, he exercised the free hand he 
sought. The Commonwealth could now be in no doubt about what to 
expect from his involvement in the Copyright Conference: consent to 
all British proposals, and more practically, commitment to legislate in 
conformity with the British Copyright Act once it was enacted. 
Resolutions and conclusion 
The Copyright Conference agreed 12 resolutions. 
Resolution 1 recommended that the British Government ratify the 
Berlin Convention with as few reservations as possible. 
Resolution 2 recommended that the British Government pass a new 
copyright law applicable to all British possessions and acknowledged 
the right of self-governing dominions to adopt the British legislation, 
pass identical legislation or decline to choose either of the first two 
options. However, a dominion could only modify the provisions of the 
British legislation if the modifications applied to the jurisdiction of the 
dominion alone. If a dominion chose to ignore the British legislation it 
would possess no rights in other parts of the Empire except as 
conferred by Order in Council or by order of the Governor of a 
dominion in Council. 
Resolution 3 recommended that once the new imperial legislation took 
effect the existing imperial legislation should be repealed except insofar 
as it applied to a dominion to which the new legislation did not extend. 
Resolution 4 recommended that copyright under the new imperial 
legislation should subsist only in works of which the author was a 
British subject or resident of one of the parts of the Empire to which 
the legislation extended, and copyright should cease if the works was 
published outside such parts of the Empire. In addition, obligations 
under the Convention were applicable solely to works the authors of 
which were citizens or residents of a member of the Union. 
Resolution 5 recommended that the Crown be empowered to direct by 
Order in Council that the benefits of the new imperial legislation 
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extend to the works of authors who were subjects, citizens or residents 
of a foreign country. 
Resolution 6 recommended that subject to proper qualifications, 
copyright should include the sole right to produce or reproduce a work, 
or any substantial part of it, in any material form whatsoever and  
in any language to perform, or deliver, the work or any substantial part 
of it, in public, and, if the work was unpublished, to publish the work, 
and should include the sole right to dramatise novels and vice versa, 
and to make records etc by means of which a work may be 
mechanically performed. 
Resolution 7 recommended that in the interest of international 
uniformity to which the Conference “attaches great importance” the 
copyright term be the life of the author and an additional term of 50 of 
years. However, the Conference considered it “essential” that after the 
death of the author of a published work, “effective provision should be 
made to secure that after the death of the author the reasonable 
requirements of the public be met as regards the supply and the terms 
of publication of the work, and permission to perform it in public”. 
The recommendation concerning term was “conditional on the 
enactment of some provision of this nature”. 
Resolution 8 recommended that formalities, such as registration,  
be abolished. 
Resolution 9 recommended that the definition of artistic works be 
extended to apply to architecture or craftsmanship. 
Resolution 10 recommended that existing works receive the same 
protections as future works under the new legislation. 
Resolution 11 recommended that the “importation of pirated copies of 
a copyright work” into Britain, or any part of its possessions to which 
the imperial legislation would apply, be prohibited. 
Resolution 12 recommended copyright should not apply to works that 
infringed copyright. 
The memorandum of Conference proceedings noted that a “draft Bill 
for the consolidation and amendment of the Law of Copyright 
embodying the above conclusions was submitted to the Conference, 
and generally approved, after discussion in detail.” On this note, the 
Imperial Copyright Conference ended, on the lines laid out by the 
British Government. The draft Copyright Bill approved by the 
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delegates passed into law the following year, following further 
refinement and debate. After another year, Australia accepted the 
option of incorporation, passing a Copyright Act that adopted the 
provisions of the British legislation and included further clauses specific 
to Australia. 
